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Common wisdom and scientific evidence suggest that good decisions require conscious
deliberation. But growing evidence demonstrates that not only conscious but also
unconscious thoughts influence decision-making. Here, we hypothesize that both
consciously and unconsciously acquired memories guide decisions. Our experiment
measured the influence of subliminally and supraliminally presented information on
delayed (30–40 min) decision-making. Participants were presented with subliminal pairs
of faces and written occupations for unconscious encoding. Following a delay of 20 min,
participants consciously (re-)encoded the same faces now presented supraliminally along
with either the same written occupations, occupations congruous to the subliminally
presented occupations (same wage-category), or incongruous occupations (opposite
wage-category). To measure decision-making, participants viewed the same faces
again (with occupations absent) and decided on the putative income of each person:
low, low-average, high-average, or high. Participants were encouraged to decide
spontaneously and intuitively. Hence, the decision task was an implicit or indirect test
of relational memory. If conscious thought alone guided decisions (= H0), supraliminal
information should determine decision outcomes independently of the encoded
subliminal information. This was, however, not the case. Instead, both unconsciously
and consciously encoded memories influenced decisions: identical unconscious and
conscious memories exerted the strongest bias on income decisions, while both
incongruous and congruous (i.e., non-identical) subliminally and supraliminally formed
memories canceled each other out leaving no bias on decisions. Importantly, the
increased decision bias following the formation of identical unconscious and conscious
memories and the reduced decision bias following to the formation of non-identical
memories were determined relative to a control condition, where conscious memory
formation alone could influence decisions. In view of the much weaker representational
strength of subliminally vs. supraliminally formed memories, their long-lasting impact on
decision-making is noteworthy.
Keywords: subliminal stimulation, decision-making, unconscious processing, long-term memory, relational
learning, hippocampus
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INTRODUCTION
Decision-making is the cognitive process of collectively
integrating relevant knowledge to determine the optimal option
among several possibilities. Decision-making is considered
to depend on conscious deliberation (Simon, 1955; Bettman
et al., 1998; Kahneman, 2003; Newell and Shanks, 2014)
because good decisions require long-term episodic memory,
a proper analysis and integration of information, strategic
reasoning and formal logic. Increasing evidence suggests
that decision-making is also influenced by unconscious
mental processes (Betsch and Gloeckner, 2010; Custers and
Aarts, 2010; Baumeister et al., 2011; van Gaal et al., 2012;
Creswell et al., 2013; Hassin, 2013). Unconscious cognition
might be most relevant in situations where decisions have
to be made intuitively, for example if a deliberate analysis of
decision alternatives and their possible consequences is not
possible (Betsch and Gloeckner, 2010; Zander et al., 2016).
Here, we ask if intuitive decisions benefit from unconscious
knowledge, i.e., from memories that were formed outside of
awareness. We further ask how such unconscious knowledge
interacts with consciously formed memories during decision-
making. Are decisions and choices exclusively determined
by conscious information, or do humans integrate all
available conscious and unconscious knowledge while making
decisions? To address these questions, we tested whether
subliminal information, i.e., information presented below
the threshold of awareness, is stored in memory to guide
later decisions unconsciously. We further explored whether
such subliminally acquired unconscious knowledge would
interact with later encoded supraliminal information in guiding
decision-making.
Prominent evidence for unconscious influences on decision
processes is provided by priming studies, in which subliminal
stimuli are presented as primes to alter the conscious processing
of subsequently presented target stimuli (for reviews see e.g.,
Van den Bussche et al., 2009; Ansorge et al., 2014; Henson
et al., 2014). Subliminal primes were found to facilitate responses
to subsequently presented suprathreshold targets—either by
reducing response latency or by increasing response accuracy—
if primes and targets are associated with the same response.
Importantly, priming has been observed even if primes were
perceptually different from targets but shared the same semantic
category, and even if prime stimuli were never used as targets and
thus were not directly associated with a specific response (Ortells
et al., 2016). These findings suggest that subliminally presented
information can influence decisions not only by triggering
pre-established motor responses, but by activating conceptual
knowledge about the upcoming target (Van den Bussche et al.,
2009). In addition to facilitating responses to target stimuli,
subliminal primes were found to bias “free choices” in target-
absent trials where participants could freely choose between
response alternatives (Schlaghecken and Eimer, 2004; Klapp and
Haas, 2005; Kiesel et al., 2006; Milyavsky et al., 2012; Parkinson
and Haggard, 2014; Ocampo, 2015, 2016). Hence, the processing
of subliminal stimuli may not only influence the speed and
accuracy of responses concerning a supraliminal target but may
bring forth new behaviors in situations where choices depend
entirely on subjective preferences.
Subliminal priming is notoriously short-lived suggesting that
unconsciously processed information might not be stored in
long-term memory and thus might fail to inform delayed
decisions. The influence of subliminal primes usually dissipates
within a few hundred milliseconds and is restricted to the
immediately following target (Forster et al., 1990; Ferrand,
1996; Greenwald et al., 1996; Mattler, 2005; Dupoux et al.,
2008). Although, the precise mechanisms of subliminal priming
are still debated (Henson, 2003; Kiesel et al., 2007; Kouider
et al., 2007; Gomez et al., 2013; Henson et al., 2014), there is
consensus that subliminal primes briefly enhance the accessibility
of pre-established perceptual or semantic knowledge or stimulus-
response associations. This enhanced accessibility facilitates the
conscious processing of perceptually or semantically prime-
related targets but does not leave an enduring memory trace (but
see Bodner and Masson, 2001, 2014 for an alternative view).
Besides the evidence for a rapid decay of subliminal priming
there is a growing literature reporting long-term effects of
subliminal stimuli, suggesting mechanisms of unconscious
encoding that yield long-term memory traces. The repeated
exposure to the same subliminal stimulus was found to
enhance perceptual sensitivity to the same stimulus‘ features
when presented delayed and supraliminally, thereby facilitating
conscious stimulus identification and classification (Seitz and
Watanabe, 2009; Seitz et al., 2009; Rosenthal and Humphreys,
2010; Atas et al., 2013; Pascucci et al., 2015). Hence, subliminal
perceptual learning can durably enhance the saliency of a
stimulus and might thus boost its impact on delayed decisions.
Several studies revealed that humans can even learn entirely
novel associations between subliminal stimuli and supraliminal
events or between subliminal cues and specific behavioral
outcomes. In classical conditioning experiments, initially neutral
subliminal stimuli began to elicit arousal-related physiological
responses if these stimuli were repeatedly paired with an arousing
event such as an electric shock (Wong et al., 2004; Both et al.,
2008; Raio et al., 2012; Lipp et al., 2014; Jensen et al., 2015).
Operant conditioning experiments revealed that subliminally
presented stimuli helped to improve task performance if these
stimuli reliably predicted which behavior would lead to success
in the next trial (Pessiglione et al., 2008; Palminteri et al., 2009;
Pine et al., 2014; Mastropasqua and Turatto, 2015). Similar
results were obtained if initially irrelevant subliminal stimuli
were repeatedly followed by a switch of tasks in task-switching
experiments or were paired with specific target categories
in priming experiments: with enough practice, participants
improved on switch trials when subliminal cues had predicted
the task switches (Zhou and Davis, 2012; Manly et al., 2014;
Farooqui and Manly, 2015) and were faster at classifying targets
that were predicted by a preceding subliminal prime (Custers
and Aarts, 2011; Marcos Malmierca, 2015). Finally, dichoptic
stimulation experiments showed that the repeated presentation
of a sequence of subliminal events allowed participants to later
identify this same sequence despite their inability to detect
the underlying events (Rosenthal et al., 2010, 2016). These
findings demonstrate that humans can learn about the predictive
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value of subliminal stimuli and can utilize this knowledge to
improve their decisions. However, these findings also suggest that
subliminal learning might be slow and might only yield rigid
knowledge that cannot be transferred flexibly to other tasks or
contexts (Rosenthal and Soto, 2016). Indeed, subliminal learning
in these studies required extensive training and manifested only
as improvement within the very task that participants had been
trained on. Unconsciously acquired knowledge might thus be
too weak to interact with consciously formed memories during
decision-making.
Studies investigating the role of consciousness in memory
yielded evidence that humans are able to rapidly form novel
relational memories between subliminal stimuli and may flexibly
retrieve these unconscious relational memories in new contexts
when facing various decision tasks (e.g., Reber and Henke, 2011;
Chong et al., 2014; Reber et al., 2014; Kawakami and Yoshida,
2015). For example, the subliminal presentation of faces paired
with written occupations later biased participants’ conscious
decisions about the income of these individuals if the faces were
re-presented supraliminally for conscious inspection. Faces that
had been paired with a high-wage occupation during subliminal
stimulation later received higher income ratings than faces paired
with a low-wage occupation (Ruch et al., 2016). This effect was
observed despite the fact that participants had not noticed the
subliminal stimuli, did not consciously remember the faces and
occupations, and rated the income based on their mere intuition.
Similar effects of subliminally presented face-occupation pairs on
decision-making were obtained if participants were later asked
about the education, regularity of income, or creativity of the
work performed by the depicted individuals (Duss et al., 2011).
The subliminal impact on decisions was observed after delays
of up to 25 min and was achieved with only one subliminal
encoding trial (Duss et al., 2011; Ruch et al., 2016). These
findings evince rapid binding of subliminal stimulus pairs into
relational long-term memories that can be used flexibly in
novel tasks and contexts. One-trial encoding, relation formation,
and long-term representation of relations in a flexible format
are the defining properties of episodic memory (Cohen and
Eichenbaum, 1993; O’Reilly and Rudy, 2001; Henke, 2010).
Because memories formed from subliminal stimuli lived up to
this computational definition (Reber et al., 2012; Duss et al., 2014;
Ruch et al., 2016) it must be assumed that episodic memory
formation may proceed with and without conscious awareness
(Henke, 2010; Dew andCabeza, 2011; Hannula andGreene, 2012;
Olsen et al., 2012; Ortu and Vaidya, 2013). Such a notion is all
the more surprising as the formation and retrieval of episodic
memory, mediated by the hippocampus, was long thought
to depend on conscious awareness (e.g., Moscovitch, 1995;
Squire and Zola, 1996; Tulving, 2002).This view was inspired
by the finding that hippocampal lesions impaired declarative
(conscious) memory for facts and episodes but spared non-
declarative (non-conscious) forms of memory such as motor
skill learning, priming, and conditioning (Squire and Zola,
1996). Studies using implicit or indirect tests to examine non-
conscious forms of episodic memory (e.g., Rose et al., 2002;
Henke et al., 2003; Greene et al., 2007; Hannula and Ranganath,
2009; Duss et al., 2014; Ryals et al., 2015; Rosenthal et al., 2016)
revealed, however, that the function of the hippocampus does not
depend on consciousness but on the type of processing involved
at learning: the hippocampus mediates the rapid relational
encoding and storage of both consciously and unconsciously
apprehended information (for reviews see Henke, 2010; Dew and
Cabeza, 2011; Hannula and Greene, 2012; Olsen et al., 2012; Ortu
and Vaidya, 2013). Both conscious and unconscious relational
memories were stored for long-term (Ruch et al., 2016) within the
hippocampal memory space (Züst et al., 2015) with overlapping
conscious and unconscious relational memories interacting with
each other (Henke et al., 2013; Züst et al., 2015).
Here we ask whether unconsciously and consciously acquired
relational memories formed in one encoding trial would
interact to guide delayed decision-making. What happens
if unconscious and conscious memories contain conflicting
contents that exert an opposing influence on decisions? How
are the two conflicting strands of information weighted? In
a day-to-day scenario, this type of conflict may occur if, for
example, one reads a news article, which portrays a particular
politician in a negative light after having unconsciously
integrated surrounding information presenting the same
politician in a positive light. How much influence would the
unconsciously acquired information have on one’s voting
behavior? To study potential interactions between unconsciously
and consciously formed memories during decision-making,
we presented participants with subliminal pairs of faces and
written occupations or faces and consonant strings (control
condition) for unconscious encoding. Following a resting period
of 20 min duration, participants consciously (re-) encoded the
same faces presented supraliminally along with either the same
written occupations, occupations congruous to the subliminally
presented occupations (same wage-category), or incongruous
occupations (opposite wage-category). Faces unconsciously
encoded with consonant strings (control condition) were
presented along with new occupations. Five minutes following
the conscious acquisition of face-occupation associations, we
assessed the influence of unconsciously and consciously formed
memories on decision-making. Participants were presented with
the same faces (no occupations) and were instructed to rate each
person’s putative income on a four-point scale: low, low-average,
high-average, or high income. Importantly, participants were
encouraged to respond spontaneously and intuitively when
deciding about the income of a person. The decision-making
task thus constituted an indirect (implicit) test of memory for
subliminally (unconsciously) and supraliminally (consciously)
presented face-occupation pairs. If conscious thought alone
guided income decisions, supraliminal information should
determine decision outcomes independently of its congruency
with subliminal information. We hypothesized, however, that
subliminally formed memories would interact with consciously
formed memories to exert an influence on decision-making.
To test this hypothesis, we measured the bias that consciously
encoded face-occupation pairs exerted on income decisions
and examined how this bias was modulated by subliminally
presented occupations that were identical, congruous, or
incongruous to the supraliminally presented occupations. We
expected the decision bias provoked by supraliminal occupations
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to be increased, reduced, or unchanged depending on whether
the same/congruous occupations, incongruous occupations,
or no occupations (control condition) had been presented
subliminally. Faces that were supraliminally shown as high-
earning “manager” or low-earning “postman” should thus
yield higher or lower income ratings, respectively, if they were
subliminally encoded with the same or a congruous occupation
instead of an occupation of the opposite wage-category (see
Figure 1).
MATERIALS AND METHODS
General Procedure
We presented subliminal faces paired with written high-
and low-wage occupations (experimental condition) and
faces paired with consonant strings (control condition) for
unconscious relational encoding. Participants were ignorant
of subliminal presentations. They performed an attention
task that directed their focal attention to the screen center
while subliminal faces and occupations were presented around
the screen center (the method of Degonda et al., 2005).
This task ensured that subliminal stimuli were attended,
which is important to engage unconscious processing of
subliminal information (Marzouki et al., 2007; Finkbeiner
and Palermo, 2009). Unconscious encoding was followed by a
delay period of 20 min during which participants were asked
to relax. Quiet resting is known to improve consolidation
and retention of newly acquired memories (Brokaw et al.,
2016) and thus was expected to enhance unconscious influence
on subsequent decisions. Following resting, participants
encoded the same faces presented supraliminally. Faces that
had been unconsciously encoded with high- and low-wage
occupations were supraliminally presented along with either
the same high- or low-wage occupations, with occupations
congruous to the subliminally presented occupations (same
wage-category), or incongruous occupations (opposite wage-
category). Control faces that had been flashed subliminally
with consonant strings were supraliminally presented along
with new high- or low-wage occupations. These faces served
as baseline condition in which conscious information alone
could bias subsequent decision-making. While all participants
encoded control faces, the three congruency conditions were
implemented in different subgroups (between-subjects factor).
This was necessary to reduce memory load and because the
German language does not provide enough distinct occupation
words to implement every condition in each participant.
Participants encoded the supraliminally presented material with
an incidental learning task. They were not informed of a later
recall test.
Conscious encoding was followed by a brief delay during
which participants again were asked to relax (2 min) and
then were instructed about the decision task (∼3 min). To
measure the common influence of unconsciously and consciously
encoded information on decision-making, participants were
again presented with all faces to decide on the income of
each person (low, low average, high average, high). They were
encouraged to respond spontaneously and intuitively and to
listen to their gut feeling when deciding on the income. Following
each income decision, participants were also asked to remember
the actual occupation of the person.
Once the decision task and recall test were completed,
participants were questioned about the strategies they had used to
rate the income of the depicted persons (open-ended question).
This interview should reveal the actually employed strategies
in the income rating task. Next, participants were queried on
their expectancy and subjective awareness of masked stimuli
during the experiment. This inquiry was succeeded by objective
awareness tests in which masked stimulus presentations were
FIGURE 1 | Experimental Design. Participants were presented with subliminal combinations of faces and written high- (blue) or low-wage (red) occupations or
consonant strings (light gray: control condition). Subliminal encoding was followed by a rest period of 20min. Next, participants consciously encoded the same faces
presented supraliminally now combined with either the same occupations, congruous or incongruous occupations. The decision task followed after another break. All
faces were shown again, without any occupations, for participants to rate each person’s putative income and then to try to recall the person’s occupation as learned
before. The individuals depicted in this figure gave written informed consent to publication of their image.
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immediately followed by forced-choice questions to test explicit
stimulus visibility.
The sequence of tasks and delay periods was designed to
provide optimal conditions for studying the joint impact of
unconsciously and consciously formed long-term memories
on decision-making. The delay periods that followed the two
encoding runs allowed us to demonstrate that both unconscious
and conscious influences on decision-making depended on long-
term memory. The duration of delays was chosen such that ∼30
min passed between unconscious encoding and the decision task.
This experiment replicates and extends a previous experiment
(Ruch et al., 2016), which suggested that unconsciously formed
relational memories can bias decision processes across delays of
up to half an hour. Importantly, unconscious encoding preceded
conscious encoding by a delay period of 20 min. This guaranteed
that subliminal stimuli had to be stored for long-term in order to
shape subsequent behavior.
Participants
A total of 96 right-handed volunteers participated in this
study. Sample size was determined based on previous studies
(Degonda et al., 2005; Duss et al., 2011; Ruch et al., 2016) and
by the number of participants needed to fully counterbalance
stimulus lists across conditions. Three participants failed to
adhere to instructions, one was under the influence of psychiatric
medication, and technical problems occurred during the testing
of three further participants. Data of these seven participants
were thus excluded from analysis. The remaining sample
consisted of 69 women and 20 men between 19 and 59
years of age (mean = 28.15 years, SD = 11.10). Participants
were assigned to 3 groups that corresponded to the three
experimental conditions “identical,” “congruous,” “incongruous”:
identicalN = 32 (same face-occupation pairs given for subliminal
and supraliminal encoding), congruous N = 29 (same faces
plus semantically congruous occupations), and incongruous
N = 28 (same faces plus semantically incongruous occupations).
Experimenters were aware of the group assignment. We used
a cover story (“we study attention and person perception”) to
keep participants naïve regarding subliminal presentations and
the study rationale. This was necessary to render participants
susceptible to subliminal information (Verwijmeren et al.,
2013). We obtained written semi-informed consent before
experimentation. At the end of the experiment, participants were
fully debriefed about the study purpose and the presence of
subliminal messages and were reminded of the possibility to
withdraw their consent to the use of their data. The study was
carried out in accordance with the Helsinki declaration and
the recommendations of the local ethics committee “Kantonale
Ethik Kommission (KEK) Bern, Switzerland.” The study protocol
and the consent procedure were approved by the local ethics
committee.
Tasks
Unconscious Encoding
We used an established forward and backward masking
paradigm (Duss et al., 2011, 2014; Ruch et al., 2016) to render
face-occupation pairs subliminal for unconscious encoding.
Subliminal stimuli were embedded in an attention task. The
attention task required participants to hit a key each time
a regularly occurring fixation screen (F) was replaced by
a screen displaying a horizontal (FH) or vertical (FV) line
segment instead of a complete fixation cross (F+). Each trial
of the attention task took 1 s and started with a fixation
screen (F+, FH, or FV) that was followed by four visual noise
masks (M) and two subliminal presentations (S) constituting
the sequence F+/H/V–M–S–M–M–S–M. Fixation screens were
presented for 233 ms, subliminal stimuli for 17 ms, and
masks for 183 ms. Each face-occupation pair was presented 12
times in sequence during six adjacent attention trials spanning
6 s. During this time, one in six fixation screens featured a
target (FH or FV) that participants had to respond to (see
Figure 2A and Supplementary Videos 1, 2 for an illustration
of one subliminal encoding episode). The added total exposure
time of a subliminal face-occupation pair was 204 ms (12∗17
ms). Each participant encoded 40 subliminal faces, whereof
10 faces were combined with a low-wage occupation, another
10 faces with a high-wage occupation and the remaining 20
faces with a non-sense consonant string. Unconscious encoding
took 4min.
Resting Phase
Following unconscious encoding, participants relaxed on a
comfortable reclining seat for 20 min to allow for a period
of undisturbed memory consolidation. Half of participants in
each experimental condition (identical, congruous, incongruous)
relaxed fully and half were required to perform an undemanding
acoustic vigilance task, namely to hit a button when hearing a
tone played at random intervals of 15–25 s. This manipulation
served the aim of finding out whether a deeper relaxation (no task
vs. a vigilance task) would benefit memory consolidation. Self-
reports in the no-task condition and the number of missed target
tones in the vigilance task condition revealed that participants
of both groups were equally inclined to fall asleep, suggesting
that both conditions were very relaxing. The factor resting
condition (no task/vigilance task) was therefore excluded from
analyses but the pattern of findings remains the same if it is
included.
Conscious Encoding
Following rest, participants were presented with supraliminal
displays of the same 40 faces that had been flashed subliminally
(Figure 2). Depending on the experimental condition (varied
between subjects), faces were combined with either the same
written occupations, congruous occupations or incongruous
occupations. Ten of the 20 control faces that had been
combined with letter strings for subliminal presentations
were now presented with a high-wage occupation and 10
with a low-wage occupation (control condition). Each face-
occupation pair was presented for 4.5 s. The incidental encoding
task required participants to give a subjective, intuitive
response of how well an occupation matched a person
(poor match, poor-average match, good-average match, good
match).
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FIGURE 2 | Schematic illustration of experimental tasks. Unconscious Encoding: One subliminal encoding episode in which one subliminal stimulus (S: face with
occupation word) is presented 12 times in between masks (M). One encoding episode consists of 6 attention task trials. In one of these trials, the fixation screen (F)
contains a target stimulus (“−” or “|” instead of “+”); Conscious Encoding: Sequence of three supraliminal encoding trials. Participants indicated by button press how
well the indicated occupation matched a person ([C]: “poor,” [V]: “poor-average,” [B]: “good-average,” or [V]: “good” match); Decision Task and Cued Recall:
Participants first decided on the suspected income of the person ([C]: “low,” [V]: “low-average,” [B]: “high-average,” or [V]: “high” income), then tried to remember and
say the occupation associated to this face, and finally indicated whether they randomly guessed, had a hunch but were unsure, or certainly remembered the
occupation; The individuals depicted in this figure gave written informed consent to publication of their image.
Decision Task and Explicit Memory Test
We assessed the influence of unconsciously and consciously
acquired face-occupation pairs on income ratings regarding these
same persons (Figure 2). The previously presented 40 faces were
displayed again, each for 5 s and without written occupations, for
conscious inspection. Participants were asked to decide on the
suspected income of each person on a scale ranging from 1 to
4: low (1), low-average (2), high-average (3), high (4; response
by key press). They were encouraged to respond spontaneously
and intuitively and to focus on the depicted person (rather
than on the previously presented supraliminal occupation). The
intuitive strategy and the focus on the depicted person should
allow the penetrance of the influence of subliminally presented,
unconsciously acquired information on decision-making. We
used a rating scale rather than a binary response format
because we were interested in measuring the average influence
of both subliminally and supraliminally encoded occupations
on decision-making (occupations can conflict in terms of the
associated wage, yielding in combination an average wage) and
because the presented occupations were associated with an either
high or low wage but not extreme endpoints of wages. Scales
allow for more variance and are therefore better suited for the
measurement of implicit, unconscious influences. Furthermore,
the persons whose income should be rated were selected to look
neither wealthy nor poor. Hence, without any knowledge of a
person’s occupation participants would be inclined to select a
mid-range income. Following each income decision, participants
were required to try to remember and say the occupation
they had earlier read below the face of the person. They were
asked to indicate whether they randomly guessed the occupation
(“guess”), had a hunch but felt uncertain about their answer
(“unsure”), or felt sure they remembered the occupation (“sure”).
This cued recall test served to determine the quality of conscious
episodic memory.
Assessment of Decision-Making Strategy
Following the experiment, participants were asked whether they
had used a specific strategy to decide on the income (open-ended
question). This interview should reveal the actually employed
strategies in the income rating task.
Awareness Test
At the end of the experiment, we determined subjective
awareness of subliminal stimuli. Participants were asked about
any potential awareness of the study purpose and the presence
of subliminal stimuli with a series of increasingly specific
questions. Finally, we measured awareness of subliminal faces
and subliminal occupation words using two objective forced-
choice awareness tests (as described in Ruch et al., 2016,
experiment 1). We implemented 20 trials for each test to
achieve equal test strength as in the experiment where 20 trials
constituted an experimental condition. A new set of 20 face-
occupation combinations was used for subliminal encoding in
both the face-awareness test and the occupation awareness test.
In both awareness tests, a trial consisted of the subliminal
presentation of a face-occupation combination over 6 s (as in
the experiment) immediately followed by either a forced-choice
between two supraliminally shown faces (target face and a foil
face) or between the category “high-wage occupation” and “low-
wage occupation.” If the chosen wage-category corresponded
to the written occupation flashed with a face, the answer was
scored as correct. Subliminal stimuli were presented using the
same masking paradigm and attention task as in the experiment.
Instructions required participants to try to consciously discern
the subliminally flashed faces and words, or fragments thereof,
in order to inform choices. The order of the two awareness tests
was counterbalanced between participants. The percentage of
correctly identified faces and wage categories was the dependent
variable.
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Materials
We used 80 grayscale images of male faces from the FERET
database (Phillips et al., 1998, 2000) which received average
income ratings by students in a pilot study that we conducted
in preparation of this study. Of the 80 faces, 40 were used
in the experiment (20 in the experimental and 20 in the
control condition) and 40 in the two awareness tests (20 targets
and 20 foils in the forced-choice test for face awareness).
Luminance and contrast of all images were equalized. Faces
were assigned to 8 lists of 10 faces arranging for an equal
distribution of mean income ratings (based on the pilot data),
emotional facial expressions, facial hair, and age across lists.
Across participants, each face was presented an equal number
of times in the experiment and the awareness tests. Within the
experiment, each face was presented an equal number of times
with a high- and a low-wage occupation and with a consonant
string (control condition) for subliminal encoding and with
an identical, a congruous and an incongruous occupation for
conscious encoding.
We came up with 40 pairs of semantically congruous
occupations—such as “director” and “manager” or “postman”
and “messenger.” Twenty pairs corresponded to common high-
wage occupations (e.g., director and manager) and 20 pairs to
common low-wage occupations (e.g., postman and messenger).
The typical wage of occupations was assessed in a pilot study
(N = 34) in which participants estimated the income each
occupation would yield on a 5-point scale ranging from−2 (low)
to +2 (high). The estimated income of high-wage occupations
ranged from 0.17 to 1.60 (scale from −2 to+2) with a mean of
0.88 (SD = 0.07). The income of low-wage occupations ranged
from −0.42 to −1.61 with a mean of −0.92 (SD = 0.05).
Assuming that average income ratings on a 5-point scale are
normally distributed, we estimated that high-wage occupation
words reflected the upper 41% and low-wage occupations the
lower 34% of all possible wages. The total of 80 occupation
words were assigned to 4 lists of 10 high-wage and 10 low-wage
occupations, of which two lists contained congruous occupations
required for the congruous condition in the experiment (A
and A′ and B and B′). In the incongruous condition, high-
and low-wage occupations were swapped between faces from
subliminal to supraliminal encoding to induce semantic conflict.
A and B lists were used in the experiment and awareness
tests, respectively, in a counterbalanced fashion. Words in
the four lists were matched regarding mean logarithmic word
frequency (retrieved from the Leipzig Corpora Collection, http://
corpora.uni-leipzig.de/) and character count. The 20 consonant
strings required for the subliminal presentations in the control
condition were built by randomly assembling the consonants
contained in the selected occupation words. Consonant strings
corresponded to occupation words regarding their character
count. Supplementary Table 1 provides a list of all occupation
words, with word frequency, character count, and estimated
average income (as rated by an independent sample of 34
participants). Supplementary Table 2 provides a list of all
consonant strings.
Stimuli were presented using the software Presentation R©
(Version 16.2, Neurobehavioral Systems, http://www.neurobs.
com) on a standard Dell Notebook running Windows XP. A
Digital Light Processing (DLP) projector BenQ© SP831 projected
the face-occupation pairs (occupation written below face) onto a
screen in front of participants in a visual angle of 15◦ width with
a resolution of 1,024× 768 at a refresh rate of 60 Hz.
Responses were recorded with a standard USB keyboard.
Participants responded using their right hand, index to little
finger, tapping the four neighboring keys [c], [v], [b], [n].
RESULTS
Data Analysis
The dependent variable in the decision task was the subjects’
mean income rating (four possible answers: 1 = low, 2 = low-
average, 3 = high-average, 4 = high) for the 10 faces of each
of the four within-subject conditions, i.e., for faces consciously
encoded with high- vs. low-wage occupations and unconsciously
encoded with occupations vs. consonant strings. The dependent
variable in the cued recall test was the percentage of correctly
recalled occupations for each condition. Each dependent variable
was used in a 2 × 2 × 3 repeated measures ANOVA with
the twowithin-subject factorsOccupation/Consonant (subliminal
occupation word vs. consonant string) and High-/low-wage
(referring to occupations presented supraliminally for conscious
encoding) and the between-subjects factorCongruency (identical,
congruous, and incongruous).
We assessed normality of the two dependent variables
separately for each of the four within-subject conditions, i.e., for
faces consciously encoded with high- vs. low-wage occupations
and unconsciously encoded with occupations vs. consonant
strings. Although, Kolmogorov–Smirnov tests suggested that
mean income ratings deviated from normality [all D(89) > 0.09,
all p < 0.05], histograms, Q-Q plots, and skewness (range: [−1,
1]) and kurtosis (range: [−2, 2]) values indicated a normal
distribution. We therefore used parametric tests to examine
our hypotheses. Note, however, that the observed pattern of
results (see Section Decision-Making) was replicated when
we standardized the raw income ratings per participant (z-
transformation) to obtain mean ratings that satisfied all criteria
of normality [Kolmogorov–Smirnov tests: all D(89) < 0.08,
all p > 0.20, range of skewness & kurtosis: [−1, 1]]. The
pattern of results was also replicated when using non-parametric
repeated measures ANOVAs as implemented in the function
ezPerm of the R-package “ez” (Lawrence, 2016). Percentages
of recalled occupations were not normally distributed due to
the participants’ low recall performance (see Section Conscious
Retrieval). Non-normality was suggested by histograms, Q-Q
plots, and highly significant Kolmogorov–Smirnov tests [allD(89)
> 0.21, all p < 0.001]. The low overall recall performance
prevented a meaningful analysis and interpretation of the
influence of subliminal information on the conscious recall of
supraliminal information.
Attention Task/Unconscious Encoding
Mean hit rate in the attention task was 88.20% (SD = 9.65)
which indicates that participants closely attended to the center
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of the images provided for the attention task and for subliminal
encoding.
Conscious Retrieval
Participants recalled the occupations of 10.09% of the
supraliminally displayed face-occupation pairs (SD = 7.35%).
This low recall performance (10% means 4 of the 40 learned
face-occupation pairs) probably owes to the incidental encoding
instruction, the large amount of learning material, and the fact
that only one encoding run was provided. Recall performance
was neither affected by wage (factor High-/low-wage) nor
Congruency (identical, congruous, incongruous) as suggested by
the non-significance of all main effects and all interaction terms
in the 2× 2× 3 ANOVA (all p> 0.134).
Decision-Making
Decision-making was significantly influenced by both the
supraliminal and the subliminal face-occupation pairs. Income
decisions were strongly biased by the wage associated with
supraliminal occupations [main effect of High-/low-wage: F(1, 86)
= 13.187, p < 0.001, η2G = 0.033]: participants gave significantly
higher income ratings to faces that were supraliminally encoded
with high- vs. low-wage occupations. Importantly, this bias
was moderated by subliminal occupations as suggested by the
significant three-way interaction between Occupation/consonant,
High-/low-wage, and Congruency: F(2, 86) = 3.529, p = 0.034, η
2
G
= 0.012. Hence, subliminal and supraliminal information both
contributed to participants’ income decisions. No other main
effect or interaction term reached significance (all p > 0.200) in
this ANOVA.
To further examine the interaction between subliminal and
supraliminal memory formation, we analyzed the differences in
mean income ratings between faces supraliminally encoded with
high vs. low-wage occupations separately for the experimental
and the control condition (faces subliminally presented with
occupations vs. consonant strings) and for each congruency
group (see Table 1 for an overview of the mean ratings, and
Table 2, tests 1–8, and Figure 3A for the difference scores). Large
positive difference scores suggest a strong decision bias toward
the wage category of supraliminal occupations. We examined
the changes in these difference scores between experimental
and control faces (Table 2, test 9–12) and across congruency
groups (Table 3, tests 1–6), and we contrasted the changes
in difference scores between experimental and control faces
across all congruency groups (three-way interactions, seeTable 3,
tests 7–9). We performed two-tailed t-tests for all difference
scores and contrasts to assess their significance. We further
calculated Bays Factors (BF) for these tests to find out whether
the data favored the null hypotheses H0 for t-tests that failed
to reach significance or for tests where we expected H0 to
be true. Bayes Factors were estimated using a half-normal
prior distribution with a mode of 0 (reflecting H0, i.e., no
difference in income ratings or in difference scores) and a
standard deviation reflecting the expected effect size under H1
(Dienes, 2008, 2014). Because participants remembered only
∼10% of the supraliminally displayed occupations, we assumed
that consciously and unconsciously encoded occupations would
influence decision-making with similar effect sizes. Two
recent experiments investigating long-term effects of subliminal
processing on decision-making (Ruch et al., 2016) yielded an
average effect size of 0.4 (effect size was calculated by dividing the
reported t-values obtained for each of the two experiments by the
square root of the respective sample size and then computing
the average of the two scores). By multiplying this effect size
with the pooled standard deviation of the differences in income
ratings obtained in the present study (SD = 0.33), we arrived at
an expected difference in income ratings of 0.13. This value was
used as expected effect size given H1 to calculate Bayes Factors.
Mean income ratings revealed that unconscious and conscious
encoding of identical occupations had increased the decision
bias, whereas encoding of incongruous as well as congruous
occupations reduced the decision bias compared to the control
condition, in which conscious encoding alone could influence
decision outcomes (Figure 3). Most importantly, decisions were
strongly biased toward the wage category of supraliminally
processed occupations following the unconscious encoding of
identical occupations [Figure 3A; Table 2, test 1: t(31) = 3.40, p
= 0.002, BF = 97.44]. The decision bias was marginal or even
reversed following the encoding of congruous [Table 2, test 2:
t(28) = 1.03, p = 0.294, BF = 1.03] and incongruous occupations
[Table 2, test 3: t(27) =−0.21, p= 0.838, BF= 0.44], respectively.
Although bias in the incongruous group was negative and did not
significantly differ from zero, the Bayes factor of 0.44 suggests
that the data were only 2:1 in favor of the null hypothesis,
indicating merely anecdotal evidence for the absence of any bias.
Importantly decision bias was stronger in the identical group
compared to the congruous [Table 3, test 1, t(59) = 1.86, p
= 0.068, BF = 3.47] and incongruous group [Table 3, test 2,
t(58) = 2.34, p = 0.023, BF = 6.77]. In the control condition
(subliminal presentation of consonant strings), decisions were
TABLE 1 | Mean income ratings (M) and standard deviations (SD) for each congruency group and each condition (faces consciously encoded with high- vs. low-wage
occupations and unconsciously encoded with occupations vs. consonant strings).
Congruency group Occupations Consonants (control) N
Low High Low High
M SD M SD M SD M SD
Identical 2.396 0.228 2.604 0.319 2.526 0.319 2.605 0.275 32
Congruous 2.529 0.217 2.585 0.254 2.495 0.234 2.644 0.248 29
Incongruous 2.600 0.257 2.584 0.359 2.572 0.255 2.683 0.221 28
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TABLE 2 | Decision bias toward consciously encoded occupations.
Unconscious encoding Test# Descriptives t-test BF
Congruency group M (diff) SEM (diff) t df p
OCCUPATIONS
Identical 1 0.208 0.061 3.403 31 0.002 97.443
Congruous 2 0.056 0.053 1.070 28 0.294 1.033
Incongruous 3 −0.015 0.075 −0.206 27 0.838 0.436
Congr. and Incongr. 4 0.021 0.045 0.467 56 0.642 0.487
CONSONANTS (CONTROL)
Identical 5 0.079 0.065 1.221 31 0.231 1.398
Congruous 6 0.149 0.049 3.022 28 0.005 38.360
Incongruous 7 0.111 0.052 2.139 27 0.042 5.214
Congr. and Incongr. 8 0.131 0.036 3.667 56 0.001 274.423
OCCUPATIONS-CONSONANTS
Identical 9 0.129 0.084 1.542 31 0.133 2.268
Congruous 10 −0.093 0.061 −1.522 28 0.139 2.009
Incongruous 11 −0.127 0.077 −1.653 27 0.110 2.585
Congr. and Incongr. 12 −0.109 0.048 −2.261 56 0.028 6.474
Differences between mean income ratings for faces consciously encoded with high- vs. low-wage occupations are indicated. Difference scores reflect decision bias toward the wage
category of the consciously encoded occupations. Scores are reported separately for both unconscious encoding conditions (occupations and consonants) and for each congruency
group (identical, congruous, incongruous, and congruous and incongruous combined). Decision bias is further contrasted between faces unconsciously encoded with occupations vs.
consonants (tests 9–12). These contrasts reflect the unconscious influence on decision bias; Two-tailed t-tests with uncorrected p-values and Bayes Factors are reported. Bayes factors
were calculated using a half-normal prior distribution with mode = 0 (reflecting H0) and standard deviation = 0.13 (reflecting the expected effect size under the alternative hypothesis
H1) as suggested by Dienes (2014). See text for source of H1.
A B
FIGURE 3 | Influences of unconscious and conscious encoding on decision-making. (A) Plotted is the difference in income ratings for faces consciously encoded with
high- vs. low-wage occupations (i.e., [high]-[low]). This difference reflects the decision bias toward consciously encoded occupations. Results are shown for the
between-subjects manipulated experimental condition (identical, congruous, incongruous) and the within-subject manipulated unconscious encoding condition (faces
with occupations vs. consonants). The figure illustrates a strong decision bias following unconscious and conscious encoding of identical information, and a reduced
or absent bias following encoding of congruous or incongruous unconscious and conscious information. (B) Plotted is the change in the bias toward consciously
encoded occupations ([high]-[low]) for faces that were unconsciously encoded with occupations instead of consonant strings (i.e., [bias for faces encoded with
occupations]-[bias for faces encoded with consonant-strings]). This change reflects the unconscious influence on decision bias: positive scores indicate increased,
negative scores decreased decision bias toward the consciously seen occupations due to subliminal encoding of face-occupation pairs. The figure illustrates an
increased decision bias following unconscious and conscious encoding of identical occupations, and a reduced bias following encoding of non-identical (congruous
or incongruous) information. Displayed are group means with SEMs. #p < 0.10, *p < 0.05 (uncorrected two-tailed t-tests).
biased toward consciously encoded occupations (Table 2, tests
5–7, albeit not significantly so for the identical group) and
did not significantly differ between congruency groups (Table 3,
tests 4–6, all p > 0.39, all BF < 0.73). The change in decision
bias between faces that had been presented subliminally with
occupations vs. consonant strings failed to reach significance for
each congruency group (Table 2, tests 9–11). If the data of the
congruous and incongruous group were pooled in a post-hoc
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TABLE 3 | Difference in decision bias between congruency groups.
Unconscious encoding Test # Descriptives t-test BF
Group contrasts M (diff) SEM (diff) t df p
OCCUPATIONS
Identical vs. Congr. 1 0.151 0.081 1.860 59 0.068 3.468
Identical vs. Incongr. 2 0.223 0.095 2.337 58 0.023 6.774
Congr. vs. Incongr. 3 0.072 0.091 0.791 55 0.432 1.049
CONSONANTS (CONTROL)
Identical vs. Congr. 4 −0.070 0.083 −0.850 59 0.399 0.330
Identical vs. Incongr. 5 −0.033 0.085 −0.386 58 0.701 0.431
Congr. vs. Incongr. 6 0.038 0.072 0.523 55 0.603 0.728
OCCUPATIONS-CONSONANTS
Identical vs. Congr. 7 0.222 0.105 2.105 59 0.040 4.557
Identical vs. Incongr. 8 0.256 0.115 2.231 58 0.030 5.111
Congr. vs. Incongr. 9 0.034 0.098 0.351 55 0.727 0.764
Between-group differences in decision bias toward consciously encoded occupations (differences of the difference between income ratings for faces consciously encoded with high
vs. low-wage occupations) are reported separately for faces unconsciously encoded with occupations and consonants. Furthermore, the contrast in the decision bias between faces
unconsciously encoded with occupations vs. consonant strings is compared between groups; Two-tailed t-tests with uncorrected p-values and Bayes Factors are reported. Bayes
factors were calculated using a half-normal prior distribution with mode = 0 (reflecting H0) and with standard deviation = 0.13 (reflecting the expected effect size under the alternative
hypothesis H1) as suggested by Dienes (2014). See text for source of H1.
analysis, decision bias was significantly reduced compared to the
control condition [Table 2, test 12, t(56) = −2.26, p = 0.028,
BF = 6.47]. Importantly, the change in decision bias between
experimental and control stimuli differed significantly between
the identical group and both the congruous and the incongruous
groups (both p < 0.04, both BF > 4.55; Figure 3B and Table 3,
tests 7–8).
In short, decision bias was increased following the subliminal
and supraliminal processing of identical occupations, but not
semantically congruous occupations. Encoding of congruous and
incongruous occupations reduced the decision bias compared
to the control condition in which faces were subliminally
paired with consonant strings. Although, these findings reveal
that subliminal stimulation altered subsequent decisions, the
pattern of results might suggest that participants did not encode
the semantic content of subliminal words and did not form
semantically precise relational memories for face-occupation
pairs.
Assessment of Decision-Making Strategy
Participants were instructed to decide spontaneously and
intuitively and to focus on the depicted person (not the
occupation they had earlier read below the face) when
making their income decision. These instructions should allow
the penetrance of the influence of available unconscious,
implicit knowledge on decision-making. Note however, that
income decisions in all trials were immediately followed by
a direct test of explicit memory: participants were required
to remember the supraliminally presented occupation. This
second task might have motivated participants to first try
to retrieve the person’s occupation and then to rate the
income accordingly. This explicit-memory-informed strategy
might reduce the impact of subliminally presented face-
occupation pairs on decision-making. We therefore tried to
determine the strategies that participants had used to form their
decisions.
We performed a qualitative analysis of participants’ answers
to the post-experimentally posed question of what strategy they
had used to rate the income. 70.1% of participants reported
having focused on aspects of the depicted person (e.g., charisma
or emotional expression, age, cleanliness, facial features such as
hairline, similarity with familiar persons, attractiveness). 34.8%
of participants explicitly mentioned that they had responded
intuitively (note that responses were non-exclusive). Only 12.4%
of participants reported that they had tried to remember the
associated occupation first only to then deduce the income of
the person. The qualitative pattern of results for the decision-
making task did not change when these participants were
excluded from the analysis: the critical three-way interaction
betweenOccupation/consonant,High-/low-wage, andCongruency
on income decisions remained significant [F(2, 75) = 3.224,
p = 0.045]. This suggests that findings were not affected by the
subset of participants who employed a memory-based decision
strategy.
To determine participants’ decision strategy in a more
objective way, we calculated their “decision accuracy,” i.e., the
percentage of decisions that corresponded to the wage-category
of the supraliminal occupation (% of ratings 3 and 4 for
high- and 1 and 2 for low-wage occupations). We determined
each participant’s accuracy averaged across all faces as well as
separately for faces for which occupation retrieval succeeded
vs. failed. Classification accuracy averaged across all faces was
low (53.0%, SEM = 0.9%) but exceeded chance level of 50%
[t(88) = 3.26, p = 0.002]. Hence, decisions were only weakly
influenced by supraliminally seen occupations, which suggests
that participants decided intuitively. Importantly, accuracy was
much higher for faces for which participants succeeded vs.
failed to remember the supraliminally presented occupation
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[76.6 ± 3.1% vs. 50.6 ± 1.0%; main effect of Retrieval:
F(1, 81) = 59.715, p < 0.001]. Accuracy of income ratings (based
on supraliminally presented occupations) exceeded chance level
only if occupations were remembered [t(83) = 8.56, p < 0.001.
vs. t(88) = 0.55, p = 0.583]. This suggests that participants relied
on the wage-category of supraliminally presented occupations
only in trials, where encoding and later explicit retrieval were
successful. However, the explicit retrieval may have been delayed
to the second task, where it was demanded. This would
reduce the influence of supraliminally formed memories at
that moment to a preconscious effect that influenced intuitive
decisions along with any unconscious effect due to subliminal
encoding. The fact that decision accuracy was only 75% even
when occupations were remembered speaks in favor of this
assumption.
The rather weak influence of supraliminally seen occupation
words on income decisions as well as the fact that only a
few of these occupations were remembered might suggest that
participants employed an intuitive rather than a memory-
based decision strategy. Nevertheless, it is still possible that the
mere attempt to retrieve the face-associated occupation altered
decision-making even if retrieval failed. To assess this possible
interaction between the explicit memory test and the decision-
making task, we analyzed the correlation between income
decisions and the wage-category of subsequently reported but
incorrect occupation words at the single-trial level. Only trials
in which participants named an incorrect occupation that was
not related to the face-associated supraliminal occupation were
analyzed. Furthermore, only those occupations were analyzed for
which the associated wage-category could be determined, i.e.,
occupations that were very similar to one of the occupation words
used for this study. Income ratings were strongly correlated
with the wage-category of occupations reported in the explicit
memory test even if participants failed to recall the correct
occupation (rS = 0.516, p < 0.001, N = 1,902 trials). This might
suggest that participants tried to come up with an occupation
from which they could deduce the income of a face instead of
deciding intuitively. However, it is equally likely that participants
intuitively decided on the income of a face and then tried to
find a matching occupation in the memory test. The fact that
participants had to decide rapidly (within 5 s) speaks for the latter
interpretation.
Assessment of Potentially Confounding Factors
Because Congruency was manipulated across subjects, it is
important to verify that participants’ general decision-making
style was comparable across groups and that income decisions
varied due to subliminal and supraliminal stimulation, not due
to a sampling bias. Congruency groups neither differed in their
overall income-ratings nor in the way they were influenced
by supraliminally presented information, i.e., in their general
decision bias. This was suggested by the fact that neither the
between-subjects effect Congruency [F(2, 86) = 1.536, p = 0.221,
η
2
G = 0.014), nor the interaction of Congruency with the wage-
category (High-/low) of supraliminal occupations [F(2, 86) =
1.051, p = 0.354, η2G = 0.005] reached significance in the overall
ANOVA. As reported earlier, only the three-way interaction
Occupation/consonant, High-/low-wage, and Congruency reached
significance. Hence, the content of subliminal stimuli, not
group membership per-se, moderated the observed differences
in decision-making across Congruency groups. This finding
was confirmed if the same ANOVA was performed for only
those faces that were subliminally encoded with consonant
strings (control condition): only the main effect of High-/low-
wage reached significance [F(2, 86) = 11.952, p < 0.001, η
2
G
= 0.046]. Congruency and the interaction between Congruency
and High-/Low-wage again failed to reach significance (all p >
0.468). Hence, participants in the different congruency groups
gave similar income ratings and showed a similar decision
bias for faces that were not associated with a (identical,
congruous, or incongruous) subliminal occupation. Only for
faces subliminally presented with occupations, did the interaction
between Congruency and High-/Low-wage reach significance
[F(2, 86) = 3.337, p = 0.040, η
2
G = 0.069]. Hence, the decision
bias varied across Congruency groups only with respect to
subliminally presented occupation words, not due to an overall
group bias.
Furthermore, none of the following variables differed
significantly between Congruency groups: response latencies
during decision making [F(2, 86) = 0.558, p = 0.575], explicit
recall performance [F(2, 86) = 0.221, p = 0.802], age [F(2, 85) =
1.180, p = 0.312], hit rate on the attention task given during
unconscious encoding [F(2, 86) = 0.551, p = 0.578), gender
distribution [χ2
(2)
= 0.784, p = 0.676], awareness of subliminal
stimuli (see Section Awareness Test), self-reported decision-
making strategy [intuition: χ2
(2)
= 4.26, p = 0.119; focusing on
aspects of faces or persons: χ2
(2)
= 0.107, p = 0.948, focusing
on associated occupation: χ2
(2)
= 0.205, p = 0.903], and decision
accuracy (see Section Assessment of Decision-Making Strategy),
i.e., the percentage of income decisions that corresponded to
the wage-category of supraliminally seen occupations (all p >
0.418). This further suggests that participant groups were highly
comparable.
Awareness Test
The inquiry into subjective awareness revealed that no
participant had suspected subliminal stimuli or noticed
faces, words, or fragments thereof between masks. The objective
awareness tests corroborated this result. Performance on the
objective face and occupation awareness test did not significantly
deviate from the chance level of 50% [face awareness test: mean
accuracy = 50.17%, 95% CI [47.65, 52.70], t(86) = 0.136, p =
0.892; occupation awareness test: mean accuracy = 49.11%,
95% CI [47.02, 51.20], t(88) = −0.844, p = 0.401]. Note that
non-significance does not necessarily mean that participants
were truly unaware (i.e., that the null hypothesis is true). It is
possible that our tests were not sensitive enough to distinguish
between the null and alternative hypothesis (Dienes, 2014).
To assess if there was substantial evidence for the absence of
awareness, we calculated Bayes Factors (BF) for the two t-tests.
We assumed that awareness for subliminal stimuli would yield
a recognition performance of about 5% above chance level.
This is the performance achieved in tests that assessed indirect
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influences of subliminal face-occupations pairs on decision-
making (about 6% in (Duss et al., 2011); about 4% in Ruch
et al., 2016). We therefore used a half-normal prior distribution
with a mode of 0% (reflecting chance-level performance) and
a standard deviation of 5% (expected performance in case of
awareness) to calculate BFs (Dienes, 2008, 2014). This yielded
a BF of 0.27 for the awareness of faces (mean = 0.17% above
chance, standard error of sample SE = 1.27%) and 0.12 for
the awareness of occupations (mean = −0.89%, SE = 1.05%).
Bayes Factors were below 1/3, suggesting that there is substantial
evidence for the null assumption that participants were not
aware of masked faces and occupation words. Furthermore,
performance in neither of the two tests differed between the
condition groups (identical, congruous, incongruous): face
awareness test F(2, 84) = 0.993, p= 0.375, η
2
p = 0.023; occupation
awareness test F(2, 84) = 0.092, p = 0.912, η
2
p = 0.002. Hence,
between-group differences discovered in the experiment are
unlikely to reflect differences in the awareness of subliminal
stimuli.
DISCUSSION
Decision-making was influenced by both subliminally and
supraliminally displayed combinations of faces and written
occupations. Income decisions were biased toward the
wage category of supraliminally presented occupations, and
this bias was either increased or reduced by subliminal
encoding, depending on whether subliminal and supraliminal
occupations were identical or not. Identical subliminal and
supraliminal occupations added up, yielding the strongest
observed bias on income decisions, whereas non-identical
(incongruous and semantically congruous) occupations
canceled each other out, leaving no clearly discernible or
even a numerically inverted decision bias (illustrated in
Figure 2B). This finding speaks to the power and longevity
of subliminally encoded memories because at least 30 min
passed between subliminal encoding and decision-making.
Post-experimental awareness tests demonstrated that subliminal
faces and occupations were presented below the objective
threshold of conscious awareness. We deduce from this finding
that the subliminal face-occupation combinations presented
in the experiment guided decision-making completely outside
of conscious awareness. Because participants remembered
only about 10% of the supraliminally provided occupation–
face combinations, choice behavior in many trials was likely
also influenced by supraliminally provided information that
was forgotten and hence only unconsciously available. This
further emphasizes the role of non-conscious memories in
decision-making.
Our results might suggest that subliminally presented faces
and occupations were not bound into semantically precise
relational memories but merely primed subsequent conscious
processing of words and faces due to enhanced perceptual
fluency. In fact, the subliminal presentation of faces paired with
occupation words instead of consonant strings increased the
influence of supraliminal face-occupation pairs on subsequent
decisions only if subliminal and supraliminal occupations
were identical. Subliminal presentation of non-identical but
semantically congruous occupations that reflected the same
wage category and a similar field of work (e.g., “historian”
and “archeologist”) reduced the supraliminal influence on
decisions. This might suggest that subliminal stimulation merely
enhanced the perceptual fluency of distinct faces and word
forms without leaving a relational memory trace. According
to this perspective, an enhanced word and face fluency would
facilitate the subsequent conscious encoding and retrieval of
identical faces and words which would boost the supraliminal
influence on income decisions. Changes in perceptual fluency
due to subliminal stimulation might also account for the
finding that the supraliminal influence on decision-making
was impaired following subliminal presentation of faces paired
with non-identical (congruous and incongruous) occupation
words compared to consonant strings (control). If meaningful
subliminal words undergo more cognitive processing than non-
words, words might reduce the resources available for the
processing of subliminal faces. Hence, subliminal faces might be
better processed in the control than the experimental condition,
which would facilitate encoding and retrieval of supraliminal
faces and would enhance the supraliminal influence on income
decisions. This scenario of perceptual priming thus accounts
for both subliminal effects—the enhanced decision bias for
identical face-occupation pairs and the reduced decision bias
for non-identical pairs. This parsimonious interpretation of
results contradicts, however, the well-established fact that one-
trial subliminal priming is short-lived and limited to the prime-
adjacent target (for a review see Bodner and Masson, 2014). So
far, only a few studies reported longer lasting subliminal priming
effects. But these could not fully exclude prime awareness
(Francken et al., 2011; Muscarella et al., 2013) and they provided
only neuronal but no behavioral evidence for priming (Gaillard
et al., 2007) or repeatedly presented the same stimulus over many
encoding episodes to achieve long-term priming (Chen et al.,
2009). Yet, here we observed long-lasting subliminal influences
on the behavior in participants who were completely unaware
of subliminal stimulation and who received only one subliminal
encoding trial. Hence, this pattern of results is atypical for
subliminal perceptual face and word priming. Yet, it nicely lines
up with previous findings of unconscious relational learning
from subliminal stimuli (e.g., Duss et al., 2011; Ruch et al., 2016),
as argued below.
Although priming alone might account for our findings, we
favor the possibility that subliminally presented face-occupation
pairs were actually stored in semantically precise relational
memories that guided later decisions. Such a scenario is suggested
by previous evidence from experiments with similar designs
(Duss et al., 2011; Reber and Henke, 2011; Reber et al.,
2012, 2014; Ruch et al., 2016). For example, the subliminal
presentation of face-occupation pairs was found to shape
subsequent conscious semantic decisions regarding the income,
education, and creativity of these same individuals (Duss et al.,
2011; Ruch et al., 2016). The subliminal presentation of foreign
words with translation words (e.g., “gumpel = dog”) also helped
participants distinguishing between supraliminally displayed
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correct and incorrect translations of the same foreign words
(e.g., “gumpel = hound” vs. “gumpel = spear,” see Ruch et al.,
2016). As in the present study, only one or two subliminal
encoding episodes for each stimulus pair were required to shape
decisions that were delayed by up to half an hour. Hence
subliminal stimulus pairs were rapidly encoded into lasting
memories. Relational encoding of semantic and perceptual
associations calls on the hippocampus (Henke et al., 1997;
Holdstock et al., 2002; Prince et al., 2005), which is able to
rapidly encode information and store relations for long-term.
Perceptual priming on the other hand depends on neocortex
(Henson, 2003), which requires many identical learning episodes
to form lasting memories for single items (McClelland et al.,
1995). This explains why subliminal priming studies, most often
using single-item stimuli, yielded short-lived subliminal effects
(Forster et al., 1990; Ferrand, 1996; Greenwald et al., 1996),
whereas studies presenting pairs of stimuli that trigger relational
processing yielded lasting subliminal influences. The assumption
that long-lasting unconscious associations were formed after a
single presentation of a subliminal face-occupation combination
contradicts the classic view that consciousness is a precondition
for rapid relational learning (Moscovitch, 1995; Squire and Zola,
1996; Tulving, 2002; Mitchell et al., 2009). It is, however, in
line with much research implying the contrary (Henke, 2010;
Dew and Cabeza, 2011; Hannula and Greene, 2012; Olsen et al.,
2012)—in particular that humans can rapidly form and later
retrieve unconsciously formed semantic associations (Duss et al.,
2011; Ruch et al., 2016) by way of hippocampus (Degonda
et al., 2005; Reber et al., 2012; Duss et al., 2014; Züst et al.,
2015).
Our assumption that subliminally displayed faces and words
yielded semantically precise relational memories raises the
question why subliminal stimulation had enhanced the influence
of conscious encoding on decision-making in the identical but
not the congruous condition. Congruous occupations shared
the same wage-category and a similar field of work. However,
congruous occupations were not synonymous (e.g., “historian”
vs. “archeologist,” or “tailor” vs. “shoemaker”), i.e., they still
reflected different professional activities and were associated with
different incomes (see Supplementary Table 1 for a list of all
occupation words). The semantic distance between congruous
occupations was probably too large or too salient for participants
to synthesize congruous unconscious and conscious face-
occupation memories (e.g., “person X is a tailor” and “person
X is a shoemaker”) into an unambiguous mental representation.
As a consequence, participants may have failed to integrate
the two “congruous” associations to infer a high or a low
income.
If unconscious relational learning rather than priming is
assumed to account for our results, the question about the
mechanism of subliminal influences on decision-making arises.
Did subliminally and supraliminally formed memories exert
independent effects on decision-making? Did subliminally
formed memories modulate the subsequent encoding of
supraliminal information? Were subliminally and supraliminally
formed memories integrated into one single memory
representation or two separate but semantically overlapping
memory representations? The current experimental design and
the present data cannot distinguish between these mechanisms.
To unravel the precise nature of interactions between overlapping
unconscious and conscious relational memories, sophisticated
neuroimaging techniques in combination with multivariate
pattern classifier analyses will be required (Chadwick et al.,
2011).
The scope of our findings may be limited by several
aspects of the experimental design. First, the main factor
of interest—congruency between subliminal and supraliminal
information—was varied between rather than within subjects.
This opens up for the possibility that individual differences
in an unknown variable (e.g., the ability to recognize faces;
Wilhelm et al., 2010) rather than congruency between subliminal
and supraliminal content accounted for the observed differences
between participant groups. However, neither responses in the
control condition (which was identical for all participants),
nor any of the possible confounding factors that we analyzed
varied systematically between participant groups. Hence, there
is solid ground to assume that the content of subliminal and
supraliminal stimuli rather than a sampling bias accounted
for the present results. A further problem is the combination
of the implicit income rating task with the explicit memory
task within each trial because it might motivate participants
to solve the implicit task using explicit memory. This
explicit memory-based decision strategy might have prevented
participants from responding spontaneously and intuitively,
which would have reduced unconscious influences on decision-
making. However, only a few participants reported to have
employed an explicit memory-based income rating strategy.
Finally, our findings are limited by the fact that explicit
memory for supraliminally presented information was poor. If
the conscious encoding of novel face-occupation associations
yielded poor memories, unconscious encoding might have
failed, too. Yet, we have repeatedly shown that humans are
capable of unconsciously acquiring novel information about
subliminally presented face-occupation pairs (Degonda et al.,
2005; Duss et al., 2011; Züst et al., 2015; Ruch et al.,
2016). Nevertheless, future studies on conscious-unconscious
interactions in decision-making may be well-advised to (i)
employ within-subjects designs, to (ii) implement independent
test-sessions for the assessment of intuitive decision-making and
conscious memory retrieval, and to (iii) use stimulus-material
that is easier to memorize than novel faces and occupation
words.
Our findings confirm the view that unconsciously processed
information can be rapidly encoded into long-term memory
(Gaillard et al., 2007; Chen et al., 2009; Duss et al., 2011; Chong
et al., 2014; Ruch et al., 2016). Ruch et al. (2016) had already
reported that subliminally presented faces combined with written
occupations were stored in memory for almost half an hour to
bias delayed decisions about the income of the depicted persons.
Here, subliminally presented face-occupation pairs altered
income decisions even if the same faces were later presented
supraliminally along with potentially conflicting occupations.
This indicates that unconsciously acquired knowledge is robust.
Our findings further suggest that decisions are not determined by
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conscious processes alone but may simultaneously benefit from
conscious and unconscious knowledge. While some scholars
argue that learning and decision-making are strictly governed by
consciousness (e.g., Shanks, 2010; Newell and Shanks, 2014) our
data support the view that unconscious processes play a larger
role in everyday cognitive functioning than commonly assumed
(Rosenthal, 2008; Soon et al., 2008; van Gaal et al., 2012; Hassin,
2013).
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Supplementary Video 1 | Video of one subliminal encoding trial. Video must be
played at 60 fps to provide an accurate representation of the stimulus sequence.
The embedded subliminal image consists of a male face and the written word
“Manager.” A schematized image of a face instead of one of the original faces is
used. The individual depicted in this video gave written informed consent to
publication of his image.
Supplementary Video 2 | Video highlighting the subliminal image in one
subliminal encoding trial. This video is identical to Supplementary Video 1, but
the contrast of stimulus masks was reduced to enhance the visibility of the
subliminal images. These masks were not used in our experiment. The individual
depicted in this video gave written informed consent to publication of his image.
Supplementary Table 1 | List of all occupation words used in the current study.
Word-frequency obtained from the Leipzig Corpora Collection (http://corpora.uni-
leipzig.de/), word length (number of letters), and mean estimated income as rated
by an independent sample of 34 participants are indicated. Words are grouped by
stimulus lists (A, A′, B, and B′) that were used to counterbalance stimuli across
conditions, and by wage-category. Pairs of semantically congruous occupation
words are labeled with the same identification number.
Supplementary Table 2 | List of all consonant strings with corresponding word
lengths (number of letters).
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